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Abstract
We examine cooperative games where the viability of a coalition is determined by
whether or not its members have the ability to communicate amongst themselves in-
dependently of non-members. This necessary condition for viability was proposed by
Myerson in [14] and is modeled via an interaction graph G = (V,E); a coalition S ⊆ V
is then viable if and only if the induced graph G[S] is connected. The non-emptiness of
the core of a coalition game can be tested by a well-known covering LP. Moreover, the
integrality gap of its dual packing LP defines exactly the multiplicative least-core and
the relative cost of stability of the coalition game. This gap is upper bounded by the
packing-covering ratio which, for graphical coalition games, is known to be at most the
treewidth of the interaction graph plus one [13].
We examine the packing-covering ratio and integrality gaps of graphical coalition
games in more detail. We introduce the thicket parameter of a graph, and prove it pre-
cisely measures the packing-covering ratio. It also approximately measures the primal
and dual integrality gaps. The thicket number provides an upper bound of both integral-
ity gaps. Moreover we show that for any interaction graph, the primal integrality gap is,
in the worst case, linear in terms of the thicket number while the dual integrality gap is
polynomial in terms of it. At the heart of our results, is a graph theoretic minmax theo-
rem showing the thicket number is equal to the minimum width of a vine decomposition
of the coalition graph (a vine decomposition is a generalization of a tree decomposition).
We also explain how the thicket number relates to the VC-dimension of the set system
produced by the game.
1 Introduction
At the heart of cooperative game theory is the problem of how a group of agents should
share the wealth that they collectively create. Its foremost concept is the core whose roots
date back to Edgeworthian bargaining and cooperative improvement ([5]; see also [10]). It
was first formalized by Gillies in [7, 8] via a coalition game G = (I, v) with a set I of agents
and a valuation function v : 2I → N. The core of the coalition game is the set of feasible
solutions to:
1
∑
i:i∈I
xi = v(I)∑
i:i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊂ I
xi ≥ 0
Informally, we are allocating xi to agent i and v(S) represents the amount of wealth that
the coalition S can generate by itself. Consequently, the coalition S will block any distribution
scheme that does not allocate its members at least v(S) in total. Thus the wealth v(I) of
the grand coalition must be distributed in such a fashion that no coalition wishes to block
the allocation. The core is the set of vectors of payoffs that have this property.
This definition immediately prompts two questions: (i) What processes enable the for-
mation of coalitions? (ii) Even if coalitions can form and negotiate, do core solutions exist?
Concerning the former question, it is unrealistic to assume that every subset of agents has
the ability to act as a collective. Indeed, Myerson [15] argued that feasible coalitions re-
quire structural properties that enable them to function. Clearly, one necessary property
is that “communication” is possible between members of the coalition and [14] formalized
this ability using an interaction (communication) graph G = (I,E). Here a pair of agents
induces an edge in G if they are able to interact and a coalition S is feasible if S induces
a connected subgraph of G. Observe that two members of a feasible coalition do not need
to be able to interact directly but they must be able to communicate indirectly via chains
consisting of other members of the coalition. Thus, a coalition S is viable if and only if the
induced subgraph G[S] is connected – in particular v(S) = 0 when G[S] is disconnected.
Such graphical coalition games are the focus of this paper.1
For the latter question, the core is often empty. Indeed, it is straightforward to verify
that the core of the game G is non-empty if and only if the following primal linear program
has an optimal (fractional) solution whose value κf (G) equals v(I).
Covering-LP: min
∑
i∈I
xi
s.t.
∑
i:i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊆ I
xi ≥ 0
Interestingly, there is an elegant graphical characterization for when a graphical coalition
game has a non-empty core for all possible valuation functions v. Namely, a graphical
coalition game is strongly balanced if and only if the interaction graph G is a forest [11].
1.1 The Least-Core and the Relative Cost of Stability
Given the possible emptiness of the core, it is natural to consider solutions where the core
constraints in this Covering-LP are relaxed. Specifically, for each feasible coalition S, given
α ≥ 1, there is a constraint α ·∑i:i∈S xi ≥ v(S). These constraints imply that a coalition S
will not block an allocation unless it can unilaterally improve its total wealth by more than
an α factor. The set of feasible solutions then form the α-core. The minimum α for which
the α-core is non-empty arises when α∗ = κ
f (G)
v(I) . The α
∗-core is called the (multiplicative)
1See [6] for a general introduction to cooperative games on networks.
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least-core.2 Moreover, we can also determine the least-core by considering the dual of the
primal linear program.
Packing-LP: max
∑
S:S⊆I
v(S) · yS
s.t.
∑
S⊆I:i∈S
yS ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I
yS ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ I
Let ρf (G) be the optimal fractional solution to this Packing-LP, and let ρ(G) be the
optimal integral solution. Then α∗ is exactly equal to the dual integrality gap ρ
f (G)
ρ(G) . To
verify this, observe that ρf (G) = κf (G) = α∗ · v(I), by strong duality. But the optimal
integral solution to the dual has value ρ(G) = v(I); simply set yI = 1 and yS = 0 for every
S 6= I. Here we are making the standard assumption in the literature that, for any coalition
game, the valuation function v is superadditive. In particular, property reflects the simple
observation that any collective has the option to voluntarily partition itself into subgroups
to generate wealth. Thus, α∗ = ρ
f (G)
ρ(G) .
This paper will study least-cores in coalition games over interaction graphs. Interest-
ingly, multiplicative least-cores are equivalent to the concept of the relative cost of stability.
Bachrach et al. [2] asked how much it would cost (an external authority) to stabilize a coali-
tion game; i.e. what is the minimum total payment required such that no coalition can
benefit by blocking the allocation. The relative cost of stability [12] is then defined to be the
ratio between this minimum payment and the total wealth the grand coalition can generate,
namely κ
f (G)
v(I) = α
∗. Thus, the relative cost of stability is also given by the dual integrality
gap.
1.2 Our Results
So to develop an understanding of coalition games, we must study the primal and dual linear
programs. In particular, we will focus on the graphical coalition games of [14]. Specifically,
we are interested in how the primal and dual integrality gaps vary with the topology of the
interaction graph.
As inferred by our nomenclature, the primal and dual form a pair of packing and covering
linear programs. Thus a natural starting point is to consider the packing-covering ratio of a
game G; this is the ratio κ(G)
ρ(G) between the values of the optimal integral solutions to the primal
and the dual. Observe that, by strong duality, the packing-covering ratio is the product of the
primal integrality gap κ(G)
κf (G) and the dual integrality gap
ρf (G)
ρ(G) . Consequently, the packing-
covering ratio trivially upper bounds both integrality gaps. Packing-covering ratios have
been studied extensively in graph theory. Special attention has focused on problems with
the Erdo˝s-Po´sa property, where the ratio is a function of the packing number and is otherwise
independent of the graph. Interestingly, whilst graphical coalition games do not have the
Erdo˝s-Po´sa property, the packing-covering ratio can be bounded by an important parameter
of the interaction graph, namely, treewidth. Indeed, Meir et al. [13] proved that, for any
valuation function (game G) over an interaction graph G, the packing-covering ratio is at
most the treewidth ω(G) plus one.
2The least-core is often defined with respect to an additive (ε), not a multiplicative (α), guarantee. Since
additive guarantees are not scale invariant, it is preferable here to focus upon multiplicative guarantees.
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We extend the work of Meir et al. in several ways. First, we show that structurally
treewidth is not the most appropriate invariant in understanding the packing-covering ratio.
The topological parameter that corresponds exactly to the packing-covering ratio is a concept
we term the thicket number of the graph. Specifically, in Section 3, we show that for every
coalition game G over a graph G the packing-covering ratio is at most the thicket number,
τ(G), of the graph. Conversely, for every graph G there exists a coalition game G for which
the packing-covering ratio is at least the thicket number.
Theorem 1.1. For any interaction graph G, the packing-covering ratio satisfies:
τ(G) ≤∃ κ(G)
ρ(G) ≤∀ τ(G)
Observe that, in order to concisely formulate our results, we use the notation ≤∃ and
≤∀. Here ≤∃ means that there exists a game G over the interaction graph G such that the
inequality is satisfied, and ≤∀ means that for every game G over G the inequality is satisfied.3
Theorem 1.1 relies on a graphical minmax result that we prove in Section 2. Specifically,
we show that thickets have a dual notion called vine decompositions. These decompositions
can be viewed as a “thin” relative of tree decompositions. In particular, the vinewidth of a
graph is at most the treewidth plus one, and is typically smaller.
In principle, the primal and dual integrality gaps could be much less than the thicket
number. However, we prove the thicket number is (approximately) the correct measure for
these integrality gaps as well. Specifically, in Section 6 we prove
Theorem 1.2. For any interaction graph G, the primal integrality gap satisfies:
1
4
τ(G) ≤∃ κ(G)
κf (G) ≤∀ τ(G)
Interestingly, unlike for the packing-covering ratio, the upper and lower bounds cannot be
closed completely for the primal integrality gap. Indeed, for any graph G there is a constant
aG such that aG · τ(G) ≤∃ κ(G)κf (G) ≤∀ aG · τ(G). However aG really does vary with the graph.
In particular, we show that aG → 1 for the family of graphs that correspond to the powers
of paths. On the other hand, we prove that aG ≤ 12 for cliques. It follows that the constant
1 in the upper bound in Theorem 1.3 cannot be decreased, whilst the constant in the lower
bound cannot be increased above 12 .
Next consider the dual integrality gap. In Section 5 we prove
Theorem 1.3. There exist c and δ such that for any interaction graph G, the dual integrality
gap satisfies:
c · τ(G)δ ≤∃ ρ
f (G)
ρ(G) ≤∀ τ(G)
Again, it is not possible to close the upper and lower bounds for the dual integrality
gap completely. Even more interestingly, the polynomial range between the upper and lower
bounds is necessary. This is since for the family of grid graphs, the exponent of τ(G) in the
3We remark that inequalities of the form ≥∃ and ≥∀ are not interesting from a game-theoretic perspective.
Indeed, for any graph G, we have that κ(G)
ρ(G)
≥∀ 1, by weak duality. Furthermore, the packing-covering ratio
of any coalition game with one viable coalition trivially equals 1. So 1 ≥∃
κ(G)
ρ(G)
.
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lower bound must be 1, whereas for the family of cliques the exponent of τ(G) in the upper
bound is 12 . It follows that the exponent 1 in the upper bound of Theorem 1.2 cannot be
decreased, whilst the exponent δ in the lower bound cannot be increased above 12 . We remark
that the value of δ in Theorem 1.2 relies on the existence of a grid minor of polynomial size
in the treewidth of the graph, a deep result of [4]. Determining the best possible order of
the polynomial in the lower bound of Theorem 1.2 (between δ and 12 ) is an interesting open
question.
Finally, in Section 4, we show how the VC-dimension may also be used to bound the
packing-covering ratio and the integrality gaps. Given our previous discussion, the resultant
bounds must be weaker than those obtainable via the thicket number. Indeed, we show how
these VC-dimension bounds may can be derived from the thicket number bounds.
2 Thickets and Vines
Recall that [13] show that the packing-covering ratio can be bounded in terms of the treewidth
of the interaction graph G. To understand this, we begin with a brief review of treewidth.
We will then introduce a better fitting parameter for analyzing coalition games.
2.1 Tree Decompositions and Brambles
Treewidth provides a measure of how closely a graph shares some structural separation
properties possessed by trees. Formally, given an undirected graph G = (V,E) we may
represent it by a tree T = (N,L) and a labeling ℓ : N → 2V .4 The labeling assigns to each
node t ∈ T a subset ℓ(t) = Vt of vertices of G. For each v ∈ V we denote by Tv the set of
nodes in T for which v is included in the label, i.e. Tv = {t : v ∈ Vt}. We say that a tree and
labeling, (T, ℓ), is a tree decomposition of G if:
(i) For each vertex v of G, the set Tv is a non-empty and connected subgraph of T .
(ii) For each edge e = (u, v) in G, the subtrees Tu and Tv intersect in T .
The width of a tree decomposition (T, ℓ) of G is the size of the largest label of a node in
T minus one.5 The treewidth, ω(G), is the minimum width of a tree decomposition of G.
Meir et al. [13] show that treewidth relates to coalition games via the following bound.
Theorem 2.1. Meir et al. [13] For any interaction graph G, the packing-covering ratio
satisfies:
κ(G)
ρ(G) ≤∀ ω(G) + 1
To delve further into this topic, it is important to note that there are combinatorial
structures called brambles that provide a dual notion for tree decompositions. A bramble is
a collection F = {F1, F2, . . . , Fp} of sets such that:
(i) Each Fi ⊆ V induces a connected subgraph of G, and
(ii) Every pair Fi and Fj in F either intersect (share a vertex) or are adjacent (there is an
edge with one endpoint in Fi and one endpoint in Fj).
4For clarity, we will refer to vertices and edges in G and nodes and links in T .
5The decision to subtract one was made to ensure trees have treewidth one. Unfortunately, as is apparent,
this choice leads to an unaesthetic “plus one” in many theorems concerning treewidth.
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The hitting size β(F) of a bramble F is the minimum size of a subset of vertices that
intersects each set Fi in F . The bramble number β(G) = maxF β(F) is the maximum hitting
size of any bramble in G. Seymour and Thomas [18] proved the following minmax theorem:
Theorem 2.2. [18] The bramble number β(G) is equal to the treewidth ω(G) − 1.
Brambles (rather than tree decompositions) directly relate to coalition games. Moreover,
the relationship is actually through combinatorial structures we call thickets.
2.2 Thickets
Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph. A thicket H = {H1,H2, . . . ,Hp} is a collection of
sets such that:
(i) Each Hi ⊆ V induces a connected subgraph of G, and
(ii) Every pair Hi and Hj in H intersects.
Observe that thickets differ from brambles in that they must pairwise intersect – adjacency
is not sufficient. The hitting size τ(H) of a thicket H is the minimum size of a vertex set that
intersects each set Hi in H. The thicket number τ(G) = maxH τ(H) is the maximum hitting
size of any thicket in G.
Intuitively, thickets are indeed the objects that directly correspond to the packing-
covering ratio. The packing number of a thicket H is exactly one, but its covering number
is τ(H). We will formalize this intuition in Section 3. First, let’s see three simple classes of
graphs that will illustrate the concept of thickets, and which will also be very useful in the
technical results that follow.
Example 1: Trees. Let G = Tn be a tree on n vertices. A thicket H = {H1, . . . ,Hp} on Tn
then consists of a collection of pairwise intersecting subtrees. It is well-known, by the Helly
Property of trees, that such a collection must contain a common vertex. Thus the thicket
number, τ(Tn), of a tree Tn is at most 1.
Example 2: Cliques. Let G = Kn be a clique on n vertices. A thicket H = {H1, . . . ,Hp}
on Kn then consists of a collection of pairwise intersecting subcliques. Suppose the smallest
of these cliques, say H1, has cardinality at most ⌈12n⌉. Then, as H1 itself intersects all of the
sets in H, we have a hitting set of cardinality ⌈12n⌉. Otherwise all the cliques have cardinal-
ity at least ⌈12n⌉ + 1. But then any set X of cardinality ⌈12n⌉ is a hitting set for H. Thus
τ(G) ≤ ⌈12n⌉.
Example 3: Grids. Let G = Rk be a k × k grid graph – the planar graph formed by a
grid of k rows and k columns. Consider the thicket H defined as follows. We have a set
HR,C = R∪C, for each row R and each column C in the grid. Clearly each set is connected.
Moreover, each pair of sets intersect. So H is a thicket. Now take any vertex set X of
cardinality less than k − 1. Since there are k rows, X must miss some row Rˆ; similarly it
must miss some column Cˆ. Hence, X is not a hitting set for H as it does not intersect H
Rˆ,Cˆ
.
So the hitting size τ(H) is at least k. Consequently, the thicket number, τ(Rk), of the grid
Rk is at least k.
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2.3 Vine Decompositions
Brambles are dual to tree decompositions, and thickets also have dual structures. Since the
definition of a thicket is more stringent than that of a bramble, it must be the case that
the definition of its dual structures is more relaxed than that of a tree decomposition. In
particular, its dual will be a thin tree (let’s call it a vine!).
Formally, given an undirected graph G = (V,E), we construct a (vine) tree T = (N,L).
The labeling assigns to each node t ∈ T a subset ℓ(t) = Vt of vertices of G. For each v ∈ V we
denote by Tv the set of nodes in T for which v is included in the label, i.e. Tv = {t : v ∈ Vt}.
We say that a tree and labeling, (T, ℓ), is a vine decomposition of G if:
(i) For each vertex v of G, the set Tv is a non-empty and connected subgraph of T .
(ii) For each edge e = (u, v) in G, the subtrees Tu and Tv intersect or are adjacent in
T .
The width of a vine decomposition (T, ℓ) of G is the size of the largest label of a node
in T . The vinewidth, ν(G), is the minimum width of a vine decomposition of G. The main
structural result of the paper is that the thicket number τ(G) is equal to the vinewidth
ν(G). Before proving this result in Section 2.4, we will develop some understanding of vine
decompositions. First, let’s return to the simple examples of trees, cliques and grids.
Example 1: Trees. Observe that a tree G = Tn gives a trivial vine decomposition of itself,
that is T = (Tn, ℓ) where ℓ(v) = {v}. This is a vine decomposition as for each edge (u, v)
in G the two vertices are clearly still adjacent in T . Thus the vinewidth of a tree is at most 1.
Example 2: Cliques. Let G = Kn be a clique on n vertices. The clique has vinewidth at
most⌈12n⌉. The corresponding vine decomposition has two nodes, each containing (roughly)
half the vertices. This is a vine decomposition as for each edge (u, v) in G the two vertices
are either in the same node of T or in adjacent nodes.
Example 3: Grids. Let G be a k × k grid graph. Let the (vine) tree T be a path on k
nodes. Let the ith node in the path satisfy ℓ(i) = Ci, where Ci is the set of vertices in the
ith column of G. This is a vine decomposition. For each v ∈ V the set Tv is a singleton node
in T , and is thus non-empty and connected. For each edge e = (u, v) in G, either Tu = Tv
if u and v are in the same column of G, or Tu and Tv are adjacent nodes in T if u and v
are in the same row of G. Clearly the width of this vine decomposition is k and, thus, the
vinewidth ν(G) is at most k.
Now treewidth and vinewidth are at most a multiplicative factor two apart.
Theorem 2.3. Vinewidth and treewidth are related by ν(G) − 1 ≤ ω(G) ≤ 2ν(G) − 1.
Moreover there exist graphs for which the lower and upper bounds are tight.
Proof. Observe that a tree decomposition of G is a vine decomposition of G. Thus, ν(G) ≤
ω(G) + 1. Note that this bound is almost tight for the grid Rk; we have ν(Rk) = k (this
follows as the thicket number equals the vinewidth (see Theorem 2.5 below)) and it is well-
known that ω(Rk) = k. In fact, graphs can be constructed for which this lower bound is
exactly tight; we omit the details.
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On the other hand, given a vine decomposition (T, ℓ) we can create a tree-decomposition
(Tˆ , ℓˆ) by augmenting it as follows. We replace each link in T by a path of length two in Tˆ .
For each new node t ∈ Tˆ in the middle of the path that replaced the link (t1, t2) ∈ T we
set ℓˆ(t) = ℓ(t1) ∪ ℓ(t2). It is easy to verify that this is a tree-decomposition. Furthermore
the width of this tree-decomposition is at most 2ν(G) − 1 (since each label has size at most
2ν(G)). This upper bound is tight for cliques as Kn has treewidth n − 1 and vinewidth
⌈n2 ⌉.
As with tree decompositions, an important property of vine decompositions is that nodes
in the (vine) tree correspond to separators in the original graph.
Lemma 2.4. Let (T, ℓ) be a vine decomposition of G, and let t be an internal node in T .
Then Vt is a separator in G.
Proof. Take any node t ∈ T with degree r ≥ 2. Let T1, T2, . . . , Tr be the subtrees formed by
the removal of t. Let Ci =
⋃
x∈Ti Vx \ Vt. We claim that there is no edge between Ci and Cj
for i 6= j in G \ Vt. To see this, take any pair of vertices x ∈ Ci and y ∈ Cj where i 6= j.
Since neither x nor y are in Vt their corresponding subtrees Tx and Ty can neither intersect
nor be adjacent in T , because Tx ⊆ Ti and Ty ⊆ Tj . Thus (x, y) is not an edge of G.
2.4 The Thicket-Vinewidth Duality Theorem
Here we present the thicket-vinewidth duality theorem.
Theorem 2.5. The thicket number τ(G) is equal to the vinewidth ν(G).
To prove this we apply the approach used by [18] to bound the bramble number. In
particular we prove the following stronger result, which characterizes when a thicket can be
extended to create a thicket with hitting size k.
Lemma 2.6. For any thicket H in G, exactly one of the following holds:
(a) There is a thicket H′ with hitting size k such that H ⊆ H′.
(b) There is a vine decomposition (T, ℓ) of G such that for any node s ∈ T with |Vs| ≥ k:
(i) s is a leaf in T , and (ii) Vs is not a hitting set for H.
Before proving Lemma 2.6, let’s see why it does gives Theorem 2.5.
of Theorem 2.5. First we show that ν(G) ≥ τ(G). Take a thicket H = {H1,H2, . . . ,Hp} and
a vine decomposition T = (N,L) of G. We will show the subtree H[Ti] of T corresponding to
each element of H pairwise intersect, apply the Helly Property to find a common intersection
for all H[Ti] and see that the label of this node at the intersection is a hitting set for H.
More precisely, as Hi is a connected subgraph of G, there is a tree Ri in G spanning the
vertices of Hi. Now consider the subgraph of T induced by Hi; that is T [Hi] =
⋃
w∈Hi Tw.
We claim that T [Hi] is a tree (i.e., T [Hi] is connected). Take any edge (vr, vs) ∈ Ri. As T
is vine decomposition, we have that Tvr ∪ Tvs induces a connected subtree in T . Extending
this argument over every edge of Ri implies T [Hi] is connected.
Now take any pair Hi and Hj in H, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ p. Since H is a thicket they both contain
some vertex u in G. It follows that Tu ⊆ T [Hi] ∩ T [Hj]. In particular, the T [Hi], 1 ≤ i ≤ p,
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are pairwise intersecting subtrees of T . Therefore, by the Helly Property of trees, there is a
node t ∈ ⋂pi=1 T [Hi]. We claim that the vertex set Vt in G is a hitting set for H. To see this,
take any Hi ∈ H. We have t ∈ T [Hi] and, thus, there is some Tw ⊆ T [Hi] where w ∈ Vt.
Since w ∈ Hi ∩ Vt, the claim follows. Since |Vt| ≤ τ(G), the thicket number is at most the
vinewidth: τ(G) ≤ ν(G).
Next we must prove that ν(G) ≤ τ(G). This follows from Lemma 2.6. To see this, let
H = ∅ be the empty thicket and k = ν(G). Then either (a) there is a thicket H′ with hitting
size k or (b) there is a vine decomposition (T, ℓ) such that if |Vs| ≥ k then s is a leaf in T
and Vs is not a hitting set for H. If (a) holds, then H is a thicket of hitting size ν(G) and so
by definition of τ(G), τ(G) ≥ ν(G). We now show (b) cannot hold. For all s, Vs is a hitting
set since H is empty. Thus we have this restatement of (b): there is a vine decomposition
(T, ℓ) such that |Vs| < k for all s ∈ T , i.e. the vinewidth is at most k − 1 = ν(G) − 1, a
contradiction to the definition of ν(G).
So now we must prove Lemma 2.6. Our proof is based upon an interpretation by Reed
in [16] of the bramble-treewidth duality theorem. Before proving Lemma 2.6, let us state
two lemmas.
Lemma 2.7. Given a thicket H with hitting size h. Let X1 and X2 be hitting sets for H.
Then any separator for X1 and X2 contains at least h vertices.
Proof. Take a set Hi ∈ H. The set Hi is connected and intersects X1 and X2 at respectively
v1 and v2. Thus there is a path Pi in Hi between the v1 and v2. A set S that separates X1
and X2 must disconnect this path. This applies for every set Hi ∈ H, so S must hit every
set in H and is, thus, a hitting set. Therefore |S| ≥ h. We remark that, in fact, there are h
vertex disjoint paths from X1 to X2 in G.
Lemma 2.8. Let (Tˆ , ℓˆ) be a vine decomposition of G. Let X be a separator of G with a
component C of G \ X. Suppose there is a node t ∈ Tˆ such that Vˆt ∩ C = ∅ and every
separator for X and Vˆt contains at least |X| vertices. Then there is a vine decomposition
(T = Tˆ , ℓ) of G[X ∪ C] with
(1) Vt = X. (2) Vs ⊆ Vˆs, for each leaf s 6= t in T . (3) |Vs| ≤ |Vˆs|, for all s ∈ T .
Lemma 2.8 allows us to restrict any tree decomposition on G to one on a subset of the
vertices of G that contains a special label. This subset is the union of a cutset X and a
component C of G−X. The special label is X.
Proof. Let A and B be two subsets of vertices. Menger’s theorem ensures that the maximum
number of internally vertex disjoint path from A to B is equal to the minimum size of a
separator for A and B. Thus, there are |X| = k vertex disjoint paths from Vˆr to X. Let
these paths be {P1, P2, . . . , Pk} where the endpoint of Pi in X is xi. Because Vˆt is disjoint
from C, it follows that all the Pi are also disjoint from C.
Now consider the vine tree Tˆ . Let Qi be the path in Tˆ from from Tˆxi to t (not including
vertices of Tˆxi). We claim the desired vine decomposition (T = Tˆ , ℓ) on G[X ∪ C] is given
by taking
Vs = (Vˆs ∩ (X ∪ C)) ∪ {xi : s ∈ Qi} = (Vˆs ∩ (X ∪ C)) ∪ {xi : Pi ∩ Vˆs 6= ∅}
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Note that s ∈ Qi if and only if Pi intersects Vˆs because the node s separates Vˆxi from t in
Tˆ . Now, first let’s verify that this is a vine decomposition on G[X ∪ C]. Take any vertex
v ∈ C. Then Tv = Tˆv, a subtree of T = Tˆ . On the other hand, take any vertex xi ∈ X.
Then Tv = Tˆv ∪Qi which, again, is a subtree of T = Tˆ . Furthermore, for any edge (u, v) in
G[X ∪ C] we know that Tˆu and Tˆv either intersect or are adjacent in Tˆ . Therefore, Tu and
Tv either intersect or are adjacent in T = Tˆ . Thus we have a vine decomposition.
Now let’s show that the three required properties hold. (1) Each path Pi ends in Vˆt.
Thus, we have xi ∈ Vt. Since Vˆt is disjoint from C, we obtain Vt = X. (2) Take a leaf s 6= t
of T . The paths Qi do not contain leaves and so Vs ⊆ Vˆs. (3) Take a non-leaf s of T . If Pi
intersects Vˆs then we have xi ∈ Vs. Suppose xi /∈ Vˆs. But then there is a yi ∈ Pi ∩ Vˆs where
yi 6= xi. By disjointness, yi is not in Pj for any j 6= i. Moreover yi is not in C since Pi is
disjoint from C. Hence, yi ∈ Vˆs \ Vs. It follows that |Vs| ≤ |Vˆs|.
We now have all the tools we need to prove Lemma 2.6.
of Lemma 2.6. Assume (b) holds. So suppose there is a vine decomposition where any node
s ∈ T with |Vs| ≥ k is a leaf and does not provide a hitting set for H. For every H ⊆ H′,
the set Vs is a not a hitting set for H either. But, as we saw when proving that ν(G) ≥ τ(G)
in the proof of Theorem 2.5, the vine decomposition must contain a node t that provides a
hitting set Vt for H′. But, by (ii), such a node has |Vt| < k. Thus, H is a thicket with hitting
size at most k − 1, and then (a) does not hold.
We must now show that at least one of (a) or (b) holds. We prove this by contradiction.
In particular, take a counter-example H with the fewest number of hitting sets of size at
most k − 1.
Since (a) does not hold, every thicket H′ containing H has hitting size at most k − 1. In
particular, H itself has at least one hitting set X of cardinality at most k−1. By assumption,
no vine decomposition exists with property (b). Hence, X 6= V (G) otherwise the trivial vine
decomposition satisfies (b). Now let {C1, C2, . . . , Cr} be the connected components of G\X.
We will find vine decompositions (T i, ℓi) of G[X ∪Ci], for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, that satisfy
(1) There is a node ti of T
i with V iti = X.
(2) Any node s ∈ T i with |V is | ≥ k is a leaf and Vs is not a hitting set for H.
Since the V iti are identical we may combine the T
i-s by merging together all ti into a single
node whose label is the union of labels of nodes we merged. Observe that this will create a
vine decomposition T for G satisfying (i) and (ii). The theorem then follows. So we need to
show that (1) and (2) hold for G[X ∪ Ci].
First suppose Ci does not intersect some thicket element Hi in H. Then we can define
T i to be a tree with two nodes s and ti, where V
i
ti
= X and V is = Ci. Trivially this is a valid
vine decomposition. Clearly, |V iti | = |X| < k thus (1) holds. Now V is is not a hitting set for
H, thus (2) holds.
Therefore, we may assume that Ci is a hitting set for H. By the connectedness of Ci, we
have that Hˆ = H∪{Ci} is also a thicket. Since (a) does not hold for H, we know that Hˆ has
a hitting set of size at most k − 1. Moreover, X is not a hitting set for Hˆ since X is disjoint
from Ci. Thus Hˆ has fewer hitting sets of size at most k− 1 than H. Consequently, Hˆ is not
a counterexample. But (a) cannot hold for Hˆ otherwise it holds for H ⊂ Hˆ, a contradiction.
Hence (b) holds for Hˆ.
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So take a vine decomposition (Tˆ , ℓˆ) of G satisfying (b) for Hˆ. There must be a leaf
t ∈ Tˆ with |Vˆt| ≥ k such that Vˆt is a hitting set for H, and Vˆt ∩ Ci = ∅. If not, (Tˆ , ℓˆ) is a
vine decomposition of G satisfying (b) with respect to H, contradicting the definition of G.
We will transform Tˆ into a vine decomposition for G[X ∪ Ci] satisfying both (1) and (2).
Recall X is a minimum hitting set for H. Furthermore, Vˆt is a hitting set for H. Thus, by
Lemma 2.7, every separator for X and Vˆt contains at least |X| vertices. Therefore, we may
apply Lemma 2.8 with C = Ci, t = t to give a vine decomposition of G[X ∪ Ci]. This vine
decomposition satisfies (1) and (2). To see (1), note that ti is a leaf with V
i
ti
= X. Now
|V is | ≤ |Vˆ is | and |Vˆ is | ≥ k only if s is a leaf. Thus, s must be a leaf if |V is | ≥ k and, hence,
V is ⊆ Vˆ is . But Vˆ is is not a hitting set for Hˆ. Consequently, either Vˆ is is not a hitting set for
H or Vˆ is ∩ Ci = ∅. In the latter case, we then have that Vˆ is ⊆ X and so |Vˆ is | ≤ |X| ≤ k − 1.
Thus (2) holds.
3 The Packing-Covering Ratio
In this section, we prove that the packing-covering ratio is given exactly by the thicket
number of the interaction graph (Theorem 1.1). To prove this, let’s consider the lower and
upper bounds separately.
Theorem 3.1. For any interaction graph G, the packing-covering ratio satisfies
τ(G) ≤∃ κ(G)
ρ(G)
Proof. Given G, let H = {H1,H2, . . . ,Hp} be a thicket with maximum hitting size τ(G). We
define a game G using the following valuation function:
v(S) =
{
1 if S ∈ H
0 otherwise
Recall each set Hi ∈ H is connected. Thus v is a valid valuation function for a coalition
game over the interaction graph G. Furthermore, the sets {H1,H2, . . . ,Hp} are pairwise-
intersecting. Thus any partition S of the agents can include at most one set from H. So
ρ(G) = 1. On the other hand, with integral payoffs, we must provide a dollar to at least one
agent in each coalition in H. The cheapest way to do this is to give a dollar to each agent
in a minimum hitting set for H. Thus κ(G) = τ(H) = τ(G) and the packing-covering ratio
is exactly τ(G).
Theorem 3.2. For any interaction graph G, the packing-covering ratio satisfies
κ(G)
ρ(G) ≤∀ τ(G)
Proof. Take any game G with valuation function v over an interaction graph G. Let T =
(N,L) be a vine decomposition of G. We may assume each label in the vine decomposition
has size τ(G); if not, simply add vertices from the labels of adjacent nodes. Root the (vine)
tree T at an arbitrary node r. In turn, we may now consider each subtree of T to be rooted
at its (unique) node closest to the root r. We claim that, for each coalition Q, the nodes
T (Q) =
⋃
v∈Q Tv induce a connected graph in T . Indeed, by viability of the coalition, we
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know G[Q] is connected. Thus, for every edge (u, v) in the subtree G[Q], we have that Tu∪Tv
is connected, by definition of a vine decomposition. Then, since connectivity is transitive,
T (Q) induces a subtree in T .
Hence, we may define the root of a coalition, tQ, to be the root of T (Q). We are ready
now to describe a payment allocation x that proves the theorem. To simplify the analysis,
instead of allocating values to agents directly, we have an allocation xi,t for each agent i and
each node t in Tv. The total allocation for agent i is then simply xi =
∑
t∈Ti xi,t. We work
bottom-up from the leaves to the root, and allocate to all vertices in a label ℓ(t) in turn. At
a node t, for each coalition Q whose root is t, we compute the total amount x(Q, t) allocated
to Q in descendants of t and the residual value r(Q, t) = max(v(Q)−x(Q, t), 0) we still need
to add to Q to create a valid allocation. If Q∗t is the coalition of maximum residual value,
we set xv,t = r(Q
∗
t , t) for every agent i in ℓ(t).
By the choice of Q∗t , we can conclude (simply by looking only at allocations for t and its
descendants) that x(Q) ≥ v(Q), for every coalition Q with root t. Furthermore, if r(Q∗t ) is
positive then x(Q∗) = v(Q∗). Thus, since every coalition has a root, x(Q) ≥ v(Q) for every
feasible coalition Q. Now let’s bound the total cost of the allocation. By construction, the
cost of our allocation is
∑
t r(Q
∗
t , t) · |ℓ(t)|. Therefore, since all labels have size |ℓ(t)| = τ(G),
we have that
κ(G) ≤ τ(G) ·
∑
t
r(Q∗t , t)
Therefore, it suffices to prove that ∑
t
r(Q∗t , t) ≤ ρ(G)
To do this we construct an integral packing Q of coalitions as follows. Consider the nodes
of T from root to leaves (in a postorder traversal). Initially no node is marked as deleted.
At a node t of T , if t is not marked as deleted and the residual r(Q∗t , t) is positive, add Q∗t
to Q and mark all nodes in T (Q∗t ) as deleted. Otherwise, mark t as deleted. We bound the
packing value of Q inductively using a potential function. This potential is defined as the
total allocation in remaining nodes (i.e., nodes that are not marked as deleted). Initially
this potential is τ(G) ·∑t r(Q∗t , t). When we add an element to Q the potential drops by
τ(G) · x(Q∗t ) = τ(G) · v(Q∗t ), whilst the value of the packing Q increases by v(Q∗t ). By the
end, every node is marked as deleted. Consequently, our potential functions is zero and, so,
the value of our packing has increased by exactly 1
τ(G) ·τ(G) ·
∑
t r(Q
∗
t , t) =
∑
t r(Q
∗
t , t). Thus
Q has the desired value. It remains to verify the coalitions in Q are disjoint. So take any
two coalitions, say Q∗t1 and Q
∗
t2
. If t1 and t2 do not form an ancestor-descendant pair in T
then Q∗t1 and Q
∗
t2
are disjoint since the nodes containing vertices of Q∗t1 are in the tree rooted
in t1 while those of Q
∗
t2
are in the tree rooted in t2. So, without loss of generality, assume
that t2 is an ancestor of t1. It follows that t1 /∈ T (Q∗t2), otherwise Q∗t1 would not have been
selected. Thus Q∗t1 and Q
∗
t2
are again disjoint.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion on computational implications. Com-
puting the treewidth of a graph G is an NP-hard problem [1]. Whilst no formal proof is
given here, the NP-completeness arguments can be extended to vinewidth. The existence
of a constant-factor approximation algorithm for the treewidth running in polynomial time
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remains an important open problem. There does, however, exist a constant-factor approxi-
mation algorithm for the treewidth in FPT time parameterized by the treewidth [3]. Since,
by Theorem 2.3, the vinewidth is within a factor two of the treewidth, this provides a
constant-factor approximation algorithm for the vinewidth of the graph.
4 VC-Dimension
A ubiquitous measure of the complexity of a set-family is its VC-dimension [19]. As we have
a set-family derived from the interaction graph G, it is natural to ask whether we can relate
the packing-covering ratio to the VC-dimension. We explore this question in this section.
First, recall the definition of VC-dimension. Given a ground set I and a collection R =
{R1, . . . , Rm} of subsets of I, we say that X ⊆ I is shattered by R if, for all Y ⊆ X, there
exists some Rj ∈ S such that Y = X∩Rj. The VC-dimension of (I,R) is then the maximum
cardinality of a shattered set.
Interestingly, for any set-family, in a simple game6 the primal integrality gap can also be
upper bounded by the VC-dimension. Specifically,
Theorem 4.1. Haussler, Welzl [9] Let R be a set-family with VC-dimension d. Then the
primal integrality gap of any simple game G whose viable coalitions are R satisfies
κ(G)
κf (G) ≤ d · log d
We can strengthen this result when the family of coalitions is induced by an interaction
graph G = (V,E). In particular, let the graphical set family S = {S1, . . . , Sr} of G be the
set of all connected induced subgraphs of G. We then define the VC-dimension of the graph
G to be the VC-dimension of the graphical set family of G.
Theorem 4.2. Let G be a graph with VC-dimension d. Then, restricting to simple games,
the packing-covering ratio satisfies
κ(G)
ρ(G) ≤∀ d+ 1
Proof. Let G be a coalition game over interaction graph G. Let R be the set of coalitions of
G. Note that R is a subset for the graphical set family S of G. Let X be a minimum hitting
set of R. We want to show that ρ(G) ≥ 1
d+1 · |X|. Now by the minimality of X there is a
justifying coalition Rx ∈ R for each vertex x ∈ X; specifically, there exists a coalition Rx
such that Rx ∩X = {x}. Let J ⊆ R be the set of justifying coalitions. So |J | = |X|.
First, assume there is a set R∗ ∈ J that intersects k of the other justifying coalitions.
Let J ′ = {Rx1 , . . . , Rxk} be the collection of k justifying coalitions that intersect R∗. We
now show Y = {x1, . . . , xk} is shattered for the graphical set family S. We claim that for
any Y ′ ⊆ Y , the set R′ = R∗ ∪⋃x∈Y ′ Rx intersects Y in exactly Y ′. The set R′ is connected
since every Rx is connected and, by construction, each of them intersects the connected set
R∗. Thus R′ is in the graphical set family S and is connected. Since R∗ ∩ Y is empty, we
have R′ ∩ Y = Y ′, as desired. So Y can be shattered (for the graphical set family S), and
thus k ≤ d since the VC-dimension of G is at most d.
6A simple game is a coalition game where the value of every coalition is either 0 or 1.
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Consequently, we may assume that every set J intersects at most d of the other justifying
coalitions. Then we can easily obtain a disjoint packing of 1
d+1 · |X| coalitions in J . Simply
select any coalition R in J ; then remove R and the (at most) d coalitions it intersects from
J , and recurse. The theorem follows.
But, we have seen that the thicket number gives the packing-covering ratio exactly. Thus
we should be able to upper bound the thicket number of any graph by a function of the
VC-dimension. Indeed this is the case.
Theorem 4.3. Let G be a graph of with VC-dimension d. Then the thicket number τ(G) is
at most d.
Proof. LetH = {H1, . . . ,Hp} be a thicket with hitting number τ(G), and letX be a minimum
hitting set for H. We claim that X is shattered. To see this take any x ∈ X. There exists
some justifying set Hx ∈ H such that Hx ∩X = {x}, otherwise X is not minimal. Now take
any Y ⊆ X. Without loss of generality, let Y = {x1, x2, . . . , xr}. Now each Hxi induces a
connected graph. Moreover, the sets Hxi pairwise-intersect. ThusW = ∪ri=1Hxi also induces
a connected graph. Thus W is in the graphical set family S. Since Hx1 ∩X = {xi} we have
that
X ∩W = X ∩ (∪ri=1Hxi) = ∪pi=1 (X ∩Bxi) = ∪ri=1xi = Y
Thus X is shattered.
Combining Theorem 4.3 with Theorem 1.1, we obtain the following strengthening of
Theorem 4.2, which also applies to non-simple games.
Corollary 4.4. Let G be a graph with VC-dimension d. Then the packing-covering ratio
satisfies
κ(G)
ρ(G) ≤∀ d
Of course, Corollary 4.4 must give a weaker bound than Theorem 1.1. Indeed, the VC-
dimension of a graph G can be arbitrarily larger than its thicket number. To see this,
consider a star graph with n edges. Since a star is a tree, the vinewidth of G is equal to 1
by Theorem 2.3. But the VC-dimension of the star is n since any subset of leaves of the star
can be shattered using the graphical set family of G.
5 The Dual Integrality Gap
We now consider the integrality gaps of the primal and dual linear programs. Clearly, these
gaps are at most the packing-covering ratio, and thus at most the thicket number τ(G). It
is conceivable, however, that the integrality gaps could be much smaller than the thicket
number. In Section 6 we will consider the primal integrality gap. In this section, we examine
the dual integrality gap. Recall that this gap determines the multiplicative least-core and
measures the relative cost of stability.
Before quantifying the dual integrality gap in graphical coalition games, it is informative
to give practical interpretations of the integral and fractional packing numbers. Suppose
there is a one unit interval of time, and at any point in time an agent can choose to work
for any coalition it belongs to. Thus, each agent partitions the interval into sub-intervals
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associated with assorted coalitions. Now consider two different determinants for whether
a coalition is productive. First, suppose that a coalition can only function if its members
meet together – thus the coalition can generate wealth only if its members are working for it
simultaneously. In this setting, at any point in time t, the functioning coalitions are disjoint.
It then follows, by superadditivity, that it is best if the grand coalition meets at time t. Since
this argument holds for any t, the optimal solution is that the grand coalition to meet for the
entire unit of time (i.e., each agent contributes all its time to the grand coalition). Thus, we
obtain the integral packing solution ρ(G). Second, instead suppose that it is not necessary
for a coalition to convene simultaneously. The productivity of a coalition is then determined
by the minimum time contribution of one of its members. So coalition members may work
at different times and, in this setting, it is possible that more wealth can be generated if
the agents fractionally allocate their time amongst multiple coalitions. Indeed the optimal
solution now is the fractional packing solution ρf (G).
The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 5.1. There exist c, δ > 0 such that for any interaction graph G, the dual integrality
gap satisfies:
c · τ(G)δ ≤∃ ρ
f (G)
ρ(G) ≤∀ τ(G)
The upper bound follows from Theorem 1.1. Thus it remains for us to prove the lower
bound. To do this, we will apply some important results from graph minor theory. A graph
H is a minor of a connected graph G if the vertices of G can be partitioned into |V (H)| non-
empty connected subgraphs such that if (u, v) is an edge of H then there exists an edge of
G with one endpoint in the subgraph corresponding to u and one endpoint in the subgraph
corresponding to v. Robertson and Seymour [17] proved that every graph of treewidth k
admits a grid minor of size f(k), that is, the f(k) × f(k) grid is a minor of every graph of
treewidth at least k. Their bound f was improved several times over the years, but only
recently was a polynomial bound obtained by Chekuri and Chuzhoy [4]. They prove that
there exist c′ and δ > 0 such that every graph G has a grid minor of size at least c′ · ω(G)δ.
Since τ(G) ≤ 2ω(G) by Theorem 2.3, this implies that there exist c and δ such that every
graph has a grid minor of size c · τ(G)δ . Now, before completing the proof of Theorem 5.1,
let us learn more about the dual integrality gap of grids.
Lemma 5.2. The dual integrality gap of an n× n grid Rn satisfies
1
2
τ(Rn) ≤∃ ρ
f (G)
ρ(G)
Proof. Take the grid Rn and define a thicket H = {H1,H2, . . . ,Hn} as follows. The set
Hi is the set of vertices in the ith row or in the ith column. Thus each Hi is viable, and
Hi and Hj intersect at two vertices in the grid – namely, the vertices with grid coordinates
(i, j) and (j, i). We create a simple game G over the grid Rn by assigning value one to those
coalitions in H. Clearly ρ(G) = 1 as the sets in H are pairwise intersecting. On the other
hand, ρ(G) ≥ 12n = 12τ(Rn). This is easy to see because we may assign a fractional value of
1
2 to each set in H. Every grid vertex is in exactly two sets of H, so this is a valid fractional
packing.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 5.1.
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of Theorem 5.1. Let G be a graph of vinewidth ν(G) = τ(G). We may assume that G is
connected. By [4], there exist c and δ such that G admits a grid minor Rk of size at least
k = c · τ(G)δ . We wish to apply Lemma 5.2 to show the existence of a game with dual
integrality gap at least 12k. We define the thicket H = {H1,H2, . . . ,Hk} as before, except
now each node in the grid minor Rk corresponds to a connected subgraph of the original
graph G. Formally, denote by ui,j the vertices of the grid of size k× k (where i refers to the
row and j to the column of the vertex ui,j) and by Xi,j the connected subset of G which is
assigned to ui,j. For every i ≤ k, let Hi =
⋃k
j=1Xi,j∪
⋃k
j=1Xj,i. The coalition Hi is viable by
the definition of a minor. Again, we take the simple game G where only the coalitions in H
are given value 1. For every i 6= j, the sets Hi and Hj intersect since both Yi∩Yj = Xi,j∪Xj,i.
Thus ρ(G) = 1 and ρf (G) ≥ k2 .
Of course, any subsequent improvement in the polynomial function of [4] will give an
improved lower bound for 5.1. Nonetheless, this grid-minor method cannot provide a linear
lower bound. We prove this by considering the class of clique graphs.
Lemma 5.3. The dual integrality gap of the clique Kn satisfies√
τ(Kn)
2
− 1 ≤∃ ρ
f (G)
ρ(G) ≤∀
√
8 ·
√
τ(Kn)
To prove this lemma, we will use the same idea as Lemma 5.1 for the lower bound and
the following lemma for the upper bound.
Lemma 5.4. For any interaction graph G on n vertices, the dual-integrality gap satisfies
ρf (G)
ρ(G) ≤∀ 2
√
n
Proof. Take any game G on G. Since ρf (G) = κf (G) by strong duality, it suffices to show
that κf (G) ≤ 2√n · ρ(G). Call a coalition large if it contains at least √n agents and small
otherwise. Now greedily select a packing of small coalitions {S1, S2, . . . Sk} as follows. Let
S1 be the small coalition of maximum value. Then recursively, let Si+1 be the small coalition
of maximum value that is disjoint from {S1, . . . , Si}. Allocate v(Sj) to every agent in Sj.
In addition, we allocate 1√
n
· v∗ to every agent, where v∗ = maxS v(S). We claim that this
allocation x is a feasible solution to the primal. To see this take any coalition S. If S is large
then
∑
i∈S xi =
|S|√
n
· v∗ ≥ v(S), because |S| ≥ √n. Suppose S is small. If S was selected
in the greedy packing then
∑
i∈S xi >
∑
i∈S v(Si) = |Si| · v(S) ≥ v(S). Otherwise, let Sj
be the lowest index set in the packing that intersects S. By the greedy selection mechanism
we then have v(Sj) ≥ v(S). Therefore,
∑
i∈S xi > v(Sj) ≥ v(S) as each agent in S ∩ Sj is
allocated at least v(Sj) (and there is at least one such agent). So we have κ
f (G) ≤∑i∈I xi
and, furthermore,
∑
i∈I
xi = n · 1√
n
v∗ +
k∑
j=1
|Sj | · v(Sj)
≤ √n · v∗ +√n ·
k∑
j=1
v(Sj)
≤ √n · ρ(G) +√n · ρ(G)
≤ 2√n · ρ(G)
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The lemma follows.
of Lemma 5.3. First recall that the vinewidth of the clique Kn is ⌈n2 ⌉. Moreover, every
coalition over interaction graph Kn induces a connected subgraph and then is viable. For
the lower bound, we label the vertices of Kn by coordinates i, j that vary between 0 and√
n (i.e., we place the vertices in a grid). Let Hi consist of those vertices in the ith row
or ith column. Now, consider the game where each Hi is a coalition of value 1. Since
any two element of Hi intersect, ρ = 1. Since we may fractionally choose
1
2 of each Hi,
ρf ≥ 12
√
n = 12
√
n · ρ. This proves the lower bound.
Since n ≤ 2τ(Kn), Lemma 5.4 tells us the dual integrality gap is at most 2
√
n ≤√8τ(G).
This proves the upper bound.
6 The Primal Integrality Gap
To conclude, we consider the primal integrality gap. This measures the maximum ratio in
the cost between paying the agents in integral amounts and paying in fractional amounts.
Our first result is that the thicket number does quantify the primal integrality gap to within
a constant factor, namely Theorem 1.2. The upper bound follows from Theorem 1.1, so it
suffices to show the lower bound. (Due to space considerations, all the proofs for this section
are deferred to the appendix.)
Theorem 6.1. For any interaction graph G, the primal integrality gap satisfies:
1
4
τ(G) ≤∃ κ(G)
κf (G)
Proof. Take a graph G = (V,E) with thicket number τ(G) and let H = {H1, . . . ,Hp} be a
thicket with a minimum hitting set of size τ(G). Let X be a minimum cardinality hitting
set for H. Now consider the following coalition game G over the interaction graph G. For a
coalition S ⊆ V , we set v(S) = 1 if there exists a family H′ ⊆ H such that S = ∪H∈H′H and
|S ∩X| ≥ ⌈12τ(G)⌉. Since, the sets in the thicket are connected and pairwise intersecting we
have that S is viable; thus v is a valid valuation function.
The linear program has a solution with value κf (G) ≤ 2. To see this, consider the solution
where each agent of X is allocated 2
τ(G) and all other agents are allocated 0. Because each
coalition with value 1 has at least ⌈12τ(G)⌉ members inX, this is a feasible fractional solution.
To prove the primal integrality gap is at least 14τ(G), we will now show that the optimal
integral solution to the primal has value at least ⌊12τ(G)⌋ + 1 ≥ 12τ(G). Suppose not. Then
the set S of coalitions with value 1 must have a hitting set Y of cardinality at most ⌊12τ(G)⌋.
Now let Hˆ be the sets in the thicket H that are disjoint from Y . Then the minimum size of
a hitting set Z for the family Hˆ is at least ⌈12τ(G)⌉. Otherwise Y ∪Z is a hitting set of H of
size less than τ(G). But then Sˆ = ∪
H∈HˆH satisfies |Sˆ ∩X| ≥ ⌈12τ(G)⌉. Thus, by definition,
Sˆ is a coalition in S. However Y is a hitting set of S and Y ∩ Sˆ = ∅, a contradiction.
So the primal integrality gap (for the worst game) is within a factor 4 for any pair of
interaction graphs with the same thicket number. Recall that the packing-covering ratio is
the same (for the worst game) for every pair of interaction graphs with the same thicket
number by Theorem 1.1. Is this also the case for the primal integrality gap? The answer is
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no. There are graphs whose primal integrality gaps differ. In particular we will show that
the integrality gap for a clique is equal to 12τ(G), up to an additive constant, whereas the
class of graphs that are “powers of a path” have integrality gaps that tend to τ(G). The
latter inequality ensures that the upper bound of Theorem 1.2 cannot be improved in general
using thicket number.
Lemma 6.2. Let G = Kn be a clique on n vertices. Then the primal integrality gap of Kn
satisfies
1
2
τ(Kn) ≤∃ κ(G)
κf (G) ≤∀
1
2
τ(Kn) + 1
Proof. Recall that the vinewidth and thicket number of the clique Kn equal ⌈12n⌉. We will
prove that, for any coalition game G on the clique, the integrality gap is at most 14n + 1 ≤
1
2τ(G) + 1. Observe that every coalition S over interaction graph Kn induces a connected
subgraph and is, thus, viable. So, in what follows, we need not verify the viability of any
coalition. Let S be the set of coalitions in the game G with value 1.
Let x be an optimal fractional solution to the primal. Thus, for any coalition S ∈ S, we
have
∑
i∈S xi ≥ 1. So κf (G) =
∑
i∈V xi. Now write κ(G) as (1 − α)n + 1 by choosing the
appropriate α > 0 (if there does not exist such an α, the result is proved). Thus, there is no
hitting set for S with cardinality at most (1−α)n. We claim that κf (G) ≥ 1/α. To see, this
take any set X of (1−α)n agents. Since X is not a hitting set, there exists a coalition SX ∈ S
contained in its complement X¯ = V \ X. Thus ∑i∈X¯ xi ≥ 1. This holds for every set of
agents X of cardinality (1−α)n and there are ( n(1−α)n) = ( nαn) such sets. Each agent appears
in a α-fraction of the complements of these sets. Consequently, α · ( n
αn
) ·∑i∈V xi ≥ ( nαn).
Therefore, κf (G) =∑i∈V xi ≥ 1/α as claimed. As κ(G) = (1−α)n+1, the primal integrality
gap is at most
α(1 − α)n+ α ≤ 2α(1 − α)τ(Kn) + α ≤ 2α(1 − α)τ(Kn) + 1.
This is maximized when α = 12 . Thus
κ(G)
κf (G)
≤∀ 1
2
τ(G) + 1
This upper bound is tight, we have a matching lower bound
1
2
τ(G) ≤∃ κ(G)
κf (G)
To see this, consider the game where any coalition of size ⌈n2 ⌉ has value 1 and any other
coalition has value 0. Then we have κf ≤ 2 because allocating 2
n
to each agent, gives a
feasible fractional solution. On the other hand, κ = ⌊n2 ⌋ + 1, otherwise some coalition will
block the allocation.
There are, however, graphs for which the upper bound of τ(G) on the primal integrality
gap is obtained. Specifically, this bound it obtained for power graphs of a path. Let P be a
path on n vertices. The r-th power of P , denoted by G = P r, is formed by connecting any
pair of vertices whose distance is at most r in P .
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Theorem 6.3. Let G = P r be the r-th power of a path on n vertices where n ≥ 3r. Then
τ(G) = r and, provided n ≥ k2(r + 1), the primal integrality gap satisfies(
1− 2
k
)
· τ(G) ≤∃ κ(G)
κf (G)
Theorem 6.3 ensures that the constant 1 in the upper bound of Theorem 1.2 cannot be
improved. However, as observed in Lemma 6.2, this upper bound cannot be reached for every
graph as there are graphs where the primal integrality gap is upper bounded by around half
the vinewidth.
Proof. To show that P r has thicket number τ(P r) = r, let us first prove that τ(P r) ≤ r.
We create a vine decomposition T = (N,L) as follows. Label the vertices in order along the
path as {1, 2, . . . , n}. Then we let T be a path on ⌈n
r
⌉ nodes, where each node corresponds
to a set of vertices of the form {qr+1, qr+2, . . . , qr+ r = (q+1)r}, where 0 ≤ q ≤ ⌈n
r
⌉− 1.
Thus |Tv| = 1 and so Tv is trivially connected, for each vertex v ∈ P r. Moreover, for each
edge (u, v) in G = P r, either u and v are in the same node of T or are in adjacent nodes. So
this is a vine decomposition and τ(P r) = ν(P r) ≤ r.
Let us now show that τ(P r) ≥ r. Consider the restriction of P r to the first 3r vertices,
and construct a thicket H as follows. Let A = {1, . . . , r}, B = {r + 1, . . . , 2r} and C =
{2r+1, . . . , 3r}. We put a set H in H if it induces a connected subgraph, it contains at least
one vertex from each of A,B and C, and it contains more than r/2 elements from at least
two of A,B,C. Note that any pair of sets in H intersect. Assume by contradiction that X
is a hitting of size less than r. Since |X| < r, none of A,B,C are completely contained in
X. Furthermore, X contains less than half of the vertices from at least two of these three
sets. Thus the complement X of X contains at least one vertex in all of A,B,C and more
than half of the vertices of two of these three sets. Moreover X is connected since X does
not contain r consecutive vertices of P . So X ∈ H, contradicting the fact that X is a hitting
set.
We now show the lower bound by constructing a coalition game G on P r. For a coalition
S ⊆ V , we set v(S) = 1 if S is a connected subgraph of P r of cardinality at least n
k
, and
set v(S) = 0 otherwise. We have that κf (G) ≤ k, since allocating k
n
to each agent gives a
feasible fractional solution. We claim that κ(G) ≥ r(k − 1).
Let S be the coalitions of value 1. Now any hitting set X for S must contain at least r
agents from amongst {1, . . . , ⌈n
k
⌉+r}; otherwise, there is a connected subgraph of cardinality
⌈n
k
⌉ missed by X. Similarly, X must contain r agents amongst {⌈n
k
⌉+ r+1, . . . , 2(⌈n
k
⌉+ r)}
and, in general, r agents amongst {a(⌈n
k
⌉+r)+1, . . . , (a+1)(⌈n
k
⌉+r)} for 0 ≤ a ≤
⌊
n
⌈n
k
⌉+r
⌋
−1.
This implies that the number of agents in X is at least⌊
n
⌈n
k
⌉+ r
⌋
· r ≥ (k − 2)r
Here the inequality holds if we select k such that n ≥ k2(r+1). Hence, the primal integrality
gap is at least (1− 2
k
) · τ(G).
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